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NOUS didn't, everyone would long ago have turned his attention to more profitable areas of philosophical inquiry. Despite the fact that a "compatibilist" treatment of the so-called problem is obviously correct (Dennett maintains), philosophers are still arguing about it; the arguments, therefore, are evidently a mere facade. Behind the facade lurk fears-the fear of naturalism; the fear that one is a mere automaton; the fear that one is not really a self-fears begotten by conceptual confusion on the desire to have something to write articles about.' These misbegotten fears are not viable, but they are kept alive by extraordinary measures: continual transfusions of plausibility from really fearsome things by misapplied "intuition pumps. " My impression is that Dennett regards even the traditional compatibilist as prey to the fears that collectively make up the free-will problem: if the compatibilist weren't prey to these fears, he wouldn't bother arguing with the incompatibilist. (Dennett does not say much about other compatibilists, and he certainly does not acknowledge the predominance of the doctrine among contemporary writers on free will. Why Dennett does not tell his readers that the content of his views on free will-as opposed to his views on the etiology of the free-will debate is the prevailing orthodoxy, I'm not quite sure. I am sure that a reader of Elbow Room who was not familiar with the history of philosophy in the English-speaking countries would not learn from it that most analytical philosophers are compatibilists. Because Dennett says so little about his fellow compatibilists, my description of his attitude toward them is largely guesswork. My impression is that he regards them with the sort of condescension that Marxist and Freudian atheists reserve for old-fashioned Enlightenment atheists like d'Holbach and Russell: such people don't understand the real sources of the superstition they fulminate against and are therefore at best imperfectly free of it themselves.) Like many cultural diagnosticians, Dennett sees symptoms everywhere. (I am put in mind of a Freudian analysis of sciencefiction I once read, in which a spaceship was a phallus if it was longer than it was wide, and a womb otherwise.) An incompatibilist can't so much as mention a man locked in a room without Dennett's accusing him of insidiously suggesting that if determinism were true it would be just as if we were all in jail.2 Dennett also has an annoying trick of asking rhetorical questions of the What do you suppose it is that makes him beat his wife so much? type. What is it, he wonders rhetorically, that people find so horrible about determinism? (See, e.g., p. 15. But the idea that philosophical rejections of determinism are based on fear is one of the central ideas of the book, and it surfaces repeatedly.) Having raised the question, he proceeds to answer it. He does not raise the question whether anyone actually does find determinism horrible (as opposed to false, illsupported, or in conflict with some thesis that seems antecedently more probable than determinism). As long as we are speculating about people's hidden motives, I will speculate that philosophers who speculate about the hidden motives of other philosophers do so because it is easier to speculate about the invisible and unverifiable than to address arguments. (And, of course, it is very pleasant to represent oneself as someone who is in a position to expose the hidden motives of others. I'm certainly en-joying it.) Is this fair to Dennett? Let's say that it is as fair as speculation about hidden motives ever is.
Despite all this diagnostic nonsense-I think it's nonsense, anywaythis is a rather good book. A lot of confusions that some people are doubtless prey to are nicely straightened out3 (I particularly commend the beautiful exposure in Chapter Three of certain widespread confusions about control and self-control), and a wealth of interesting empirical information finds its way into the examples. But I don't think the book does much to advance our understanding of the traditional problem of free will. In the sequel, I shall explain my reservations.
Dennett's discussion of what I would call "the problem of free will and determinism" occurs in Chapter Six, the chapter called "Could Have Done Otherwise." I have had a very hard time deciding what the argument of this chapter is. I will present my own rational reconstruction of parts of the argument. Doubtless it is no more accurate than most rational reconstructions.
As I read Dennett, Chapter Six is mainly an attack on the principle CU An agent is morally responsible for an act only if that act was causally undetermined.
But this is a controversial interpretation. Dennett's announced target is stated in more or less the following words (he gives no "official" statement of it):
CDO An agent is morally responsible for an act only if that agent could have done otherwise (sc. than perform that act).
What Dennett means by 'X did A and could have done otherwise', however, seems to be something like 'X's doing A was causally undetermined'. At any rate, I shall argue that this is what he has to mean by this phrase if his argument against CDO is even to be relevant to its conclusion (much less valid). It might be objected that I must be wrong about this, since, according to Dennett, he proposes to attack a "widely accepted" principle-and CU, far from being widely accepted, is an object of popular derision. I answer that Dennett thinks he is attacking a widely accepted principle and he is wrong. Dennett's mistake is a complicated one. In broad outline, it is this. Consider the principle WA An agent is morally responsible for an act only if that agent was able to do otherwise.
The principle CDO is ambiguous: it might mean either CU or WA. WA is widely accepted. But it is to CU that Dennett's argument applies. Dennett's argument, or an important part of it, is something like this. When philosophers employ the principle CDO, they mean that the agent is question is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstancess. But it is in practice impossible to find out whether someone could have done otherwise than he did in exactly the same circumstances, for "circumstances"' in this context refers (in defiance of its etymology) not only to external circumstances but also to 612 NOUS the state of the agent's body and brain. If CDO were correct, therefore, we could never know whether an agent was responsible for anything. If a concept is such that we can never, in practice if not in principle, know whether it applies, then that concept, however interesting it may be to philosophers, is not a concept that would be of any use in everyday life. Therefore, if there is any concept that goes by the name "moral responsibility" and' which satisfies the demands of CDO, it is not the concept that goes by that name in everyday life.
I shall presently criticize this argument. But first I will show that it must be read as an attack on the disreputable principle CU and not on the respectable principle WA.
It is well known to students of the free-will problem that: 'could have' is ambiguous: these words can mean either 'might have' or 'was able to'. Consider the consequent of this conditional (call the agent 'X'):
X could have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.
Do the words 'could have done' in this sentence mean 'was able to do' or 'might have done'? They must mean 'might have done'; they cannot mean 'was able to'. Or, at any rate, charity forbids the latter interpretation. For suppose 'could have done' did mean 'was able to'. Then this sentence would read X was in exactly the circumstances X was actually in 0-X was able to do otherwise. Since we can never in practice return an agent's body, brain, and environment to exactly the conditions they were in at some previous time-since, in fact, we cannot even trace in any detail the workings of the brain-, it is in practice impossible to find out whether an agent's act was causally undetermined. If CU were correct, therefore, we could never know whether an agent was responsible for anyting. If a concept is such that we can never, in practice if not in principle, know whether it applies, then that concept, however interesting it may be to philosophers, is not a concept that would be of any use in everyday life. Therefore, if there is any concept that does, by the name "moral responsibility" and which satisfies the demands of CU, it is not the concept that goes by that name in everyday life.
(We may note that anyone who accepts this argument should reject the contention of Broad, Hobart, Ayer, Nowell-Smith, Smart, and many others, that an agent can be morally responsible for an act only if that act was determined.5 For it is exactly as hard to find out whether a given NOUS act is determined as it is to find out whether that act is undetermined.)
This argument seems to me to be invalid. Take any concept that we are perfectly sure we do employ in everyday life. The concept of a dog, say. That there are dogs entails the truth of Goldbach's Conjecture, or else entails the falsity of Goldbach's Conjecture. It is, in practice if not in principle, impossible for me (and you, too) to find out whether Goldbach's Conjecture is true or false. But it hardly follows from these facts that the concept of a dog is of no interest to the working veterinarian or burglar. Now it might be held that this reply works by exploiting the "paradoxes of strict implication" or some other defect in the orthodox philosophical understanding of entailment. This rejoinder, however, is directed at a merely accidental feature of the above criticism of Dennett's argument. Consider "rogs". Rogs are robotic "dogs" -creatures of the philosophically invaluable Martians-, which we cannot (in practice) tell from standard, protein dogs. Let DR be the principle, "A thing is a dog only if it is not a rog." We argue:
It is in practice impossible to find out whether a (superficially doggish) thing is a rog or a dog. If DR were correct, therefore, we could never know whether a (doggish) thing was a dog . . . Therefore, if there is any concept that goes by the name "dog" and which satisfies the demands of DR, it is not the concept that goes by that name in everyday life.
The conclusion of this argument is false, since a thing that looked like a dog but which was really a clever robot would not be a dog. The argument is therefore defective. What is wrong with it? It is important to keep in mind that this is not a skeptical argument. Its conclusion is not the (false) proposition that we never know whether anything is a dog; it is, rather, the (false) proposition that the everyday concept "dog" is compatible with "robot." Nevertheless, this argument shares certain premises with the standard "wild hypothesis" arguments for skepticism. It shares, for example, the premise that if p entails q, then one cannot come to know that p unless one first (or, at least, simultaneously) finds out whether q. This principle has come in for a good deal of deserved abuse. Dennett's argument against CU-or CDO or whatever its target is-would appear also to have this principle as a premise. I would suggest that whatever the defect in the rog/dog argument is, Dennett's argument shares that defect.
It may be suggested that the two arguments are not really parallel, owing to the fact that, while the thesis that our acts are causally determined is not absurd, not something we are justified in assigning an infinitesimal subjective probability to (some even find it highly plausible), the thesis that there are rogs at large in our environment is absurd. I accept these two judgments. But I would point out that neither the thesis that human acts are causally determined nor its denial had occurred to anyone during the formative years of the concept of moral responsibility. Therefore, no fact about this thesis (whether it be the fact that it does not seem to 20th-century, middle-class, naturalistically inclined professors of philosophy to be absurd, or any other fact about it) had any opportunity to play a causal role in the development of the concept of moral responsibility. If, in the future, some amazing revelation transpired that made us think that there might well be rogs abroad in the land, this prodigy would not change the fact that the rog/dog argument is a bad argument for a false conclusion.
Dennett has a second argument against CU-or at least it is most charitably interpreted as an argument against CU. He imagines a robot that has performed badly in some unanticipated way in a certain situation. He imagines its designers, thereupon asking one another, "Could it have done otherwise?" (He says that they use those words. It's his case; but it doesn't seem to me that people in those circumstances would be likely to say that.) What the designers would be asking, Dennett suggests, is whether the robot would behave in the same undesirable way in circumstances that were for all practical purposes the same: if it would have behaved in the same undesirable way in relevantly similar circumstances, then it "couldn't have done otherwise." (The designers would grant-if they thought about it-that the robot would behave in the same way in exactly the same circumstances; but since the chance of Man exact duplication of the robot's original situation is infinitesimal, it will probably not occur to them even to formulate this thesis.) If the robot "couldn't have done otherwise," the designers have a good reason to modify or reprogram the robot or its successors. Dennett's point, apparently, is that this case is analogous to cases in which we ask the question 'Could he have done otherwise?' about a human being, and he strongly suggests that what we really want to know when we ask whether a human being could have done otherwise is this: Should we modify him (or his successors) in such a way that in relevantly similar circumstances he (or they) will do better?-or, if we are not in a position to effect such modifications, should he be kept out-of relevantly similar circumstances in the future? We are not raising the question whether we should modify him to deal with (or should keep him out of) a recurrence of identical circumstances, since the probability of a recurrence of identical circumstances is effectively zero. Therefore, (finally), the answer, whatever it may be, to the philosophical question, 'Would X have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances?', has no bearing on the everyday question 'Could X have done otherwise?' Sometimes something like Dennett's account of the everyday use of 'Could he have done otherwise?' may be right. We send a spy into Ruritania, having given him certain training and instructions, and he is immediately captured. "Could he have done better?" we ask, meaning, Should the training and instructions of his successors be different? And we might indeed use these words, though it seems to me to be far more probable that we'd say something along the lines of, "Was that sheer bad luck, or do we need to review our training procedures?" But remember that our general topic is the responsibility of the agent (no pun intended). And if we ask, concerning the spy, "Could he have done better?" in Dennett's sense, we are not even raising the question whether he was responsible for the failure to his mission-though we may proceed to raise the question whether the Director of Espionage Training was. Contrast this use of 'could have done better' with its use in the following exchange. protest continues-these words cannot be taken to mean, 'I am, literally, unable to do otherwise'. It is certainly -true that when someone says "I can't," he often means "I can't without . . . ," where the content of the ellipsis is supplied by context. Luther (might have) meant "I can't do it without acting wrongly." The bank officer who tells you that he can't approve your request for a loan does not mean that it isn't within his power so to arrange matters that your request is approved; he means that it isn't within his power to do this without violating the bank's rules (and thereby putting his job in jeopardy). I think that there is probably something to this reaction to Dennett's reading of Luther's words, but it would be a mistake to press the point, since other cases could be found that would serve Dennett's
